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T
he goal of “personalized medicine” relies upon 
defining the genetic variation responsible for 
disease susceptibility and response to therapy [1]. 
For most common human diseases, the contribution 
of a single sequence variant to disease susceptibility is 
typically small, and can only be detected with data from 
large numbers of people [2]. Practically, this necessitates 
collaboration among investigators who either have DNA 
and phenotypic information previously collected, or have 
access to populations from which to recruit participants. It 
also requires that data be shared among the collaborators. 
Modern bioinformatics platforms have the capacity to 
combine datasets and store them for re-analysis. This is 
scientifically advantageous since it makes possible studies 
with enhanced validity in a cost-effective fashion. However, 
this data storage can complicate the already vexing practical, 
scientific, and ethical issues associated with gene and tissue 
banks. Research participants’ data may have been collected 
without authorization that meets today’s standards for 
informed consent. Research participants may not have 
consented to participation in genetics research in general, 
to inclusion in genetics databases specifically, or to use of 
their samples in genetic analyses that were unanticipated, 
unknown, or nonexistent at the time samples were collected 
[3]. Participants who consented to the collection of 
their data for use in a particular study, or inclusion in a 
particular database, may not have consented to “secondary 
uses” of those data for unrelated research, or use by other 
investigators or third parties [4]. There is concern that 
institutional review boards (IRBs) or similar bodies will not 
approve of the formation of aggregated databases or will limit 
the types of studies that can be done with them, even if those 
studies are believed by others to be appropriate, since there 
is a lack of consensus about how to deal with re-use of data in 
this manner.
Combined databases can raise other important ethical 
concerns that are unrelated to the original consent process. 
For example, they may make it possible for investigators to 
identify individuals, families, and groups. Such concerns may 
be exacerbated in settings where there is the possibility of 
access to data by individuals who are not part of the original 
research team. For example, the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) Data Sharing Policy (http://grants.nih.gov/
grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-03-032.html) requires 
investigators receiving more than US$500,000 per year to 
share the final research data. For genome-wide association 
studies, individual records are to be deposited into dbGaP 
(Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes) at the National 
Center for Biotechnology Information. While only aggregate 
data will be accessible to the public, record-level data will 
be accessible to other investigators who agree to certain 
terms regarding confidentiality and data security (http://
grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-07-088.
html). Further, databases developed for different kinds of 
studies, with different methodologies and conventions for 
analyzing and reporting results, that are then aggregated, 
may not be interoperable, leading to flawed analyses. Finally, 
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Box 1. Recommendations
1. Determine whether initial consent and ethical approval will 
allow secondary research.
2. Ensure that there are appropriate data security mechanisms 
and review bodies to protect privacy interests in aggregated 
databases.
3. Informed consent should take into account the potential 
incorporation of data into aggregated databases.
4. Address special challenges of using data obtained from 
existing databases. 
5. Pursue efforts directed at standardization of data.
6. Establish data sharing rules, including attribution of 
contributions.
7. Adopt “best practices” to avoid identifiability of the data.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1334 September 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 9  |  e190
data and specimen repositories that investigators have 
carefully collected over decades can quickly become “public” 
information, thus compromising publication priority and 
intellectual property claims.
We convened a panel of bioethicists, scientists, and legal 
experts to analyze these issues and to develop guidelines for 
aggregating databases. Our analysis focused on ImmPort 
(Immunology Database and Analysis Portal; http://
www.ImmPort.org/; see Figure 1), a Web-based resource 
being developed for the National Institute of Allergy and 
Infectious Diseases (NIAID). The purpose of ImmPort is to 
provide “…advanced information technology support in the 
production, analysis, archiving, and exchange of scientific 
data for the diverse community of life science researchers 
supported by NIAID/DAIT [Division of Allergy, Immunology, 
and Transplantation].” ImmPort provides a platform 
for investigators to store and share data that have been 
collected in NIAID-sponsored studies, including genotypes, 
experimental results (e.g., response to vaccination or stem 
cell transplant), and clinical phenotypes (e.g., healthy/
affected), but excluding individual participant identifiers. 
The charge of the panel was to consider the ethical concerns 
that arise when data are shared in aggregated databases such 
as ImmPort. Observations about ImmPort should be relevant 
to other efforts directed at aggregating databases.
Methods
Two of the authors (DRK and JS) organized the two-day 
meeting. Potential participants who were known to the 
organizers either as stakeholders in ImmPort or for their 
work in the fields of research methodology and regulation 
were invited to participate. These included NIH program 
staff working with ImmPort, bioethicists, NIH-supported 
researchers who would be required to submit data to 
ImmPort, and content experts. We sought people with 
expertise in the areas of informed consent, protection 
of vulnerable populations, privacy protections, research 
regulation, and intellectual property. Lay members of the 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center IRB 
and research participants were also included. A total of 32 
people were invited, and 20 participated. Six discussants 
were asked to present the issues and controversies relating 
to three general themes: Assuring Data Privacy and Security, 
Informed Consent, and Challenges of Collaboration. Audio 
recordings of the presentations and discussion, including 
controversial issues and dissenting opinions, were prepared 
for reference. After the presentations and discussion by all 
participants, the major concepts were summarized by the 
organizers along with a listing of problem areas and possible 
solutions, which were discussed in detail by the entire 
group. Consensus on the recommendations was achieved 
and refined through a collaborative writing process by all 
authors. The strengths of this meeting include the focus on a 
particular research topic, the ImmPort project, with potential 
wide applicability to similar initiatives, by a small group of 
persons with relevant expertise. The weakness of this method 
is also related to these aspects, as the selected participants 
may not have addressed all possible pitfalls in database 
aggregation and sharing.
Recommendations
The panel developed seven broad recommendations, which 
are summarized in Box 1.
1. Determine whether initial consent and ethical approval 
will allow secondary research. In general, this necessitates 
ensuring that data were collected with prospective informed 
consent where it was practicable to do so. If the investigator 
who submits data to a database did not collect the original 
biological specimen or clinical phenotype, then its history 
should be detailed, tracing the custody of the specimen and/
or information to the original investigator and consented 
participant. The initial IRB or similar oversight body should 
typically be able to attest that there was approval of the 
protocol used to collect the information and confirm whether 
submission to the aggregated database is within the scope 
of the original consent. Did the consent address secondary 
uses of the data or the possibility that the participant could 
be re-identified? Where the submitting investigator has 
received “de-identified” specimens and data from another 
source, the responsible IRB should have assessed the 
propriety of acquisition and study of the samples at the time 
of proposed transfer to the submitting investigator. IRBs 
and those creating aggregated databases must recognize that 
some research protocols and informed consent processes 
specify limited use of participants’ data. For example, such 
limitations may specify that data may be shared with other 
investigators doing research only on the same or related 
conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0050190.g001
Figure 1. The ImmPort System
Investigators participating in major research programs supported 
by NIAID/DAIT use ImmPort to satisfy NIH data sharing policies. 
Experimental results, genotypes, and participant phenotypes are stored 
on secure servers accessible via the Internet. Data can be analyzed 
by the original investigator within the ImmPort system and can be 
combined with data from other DAIT-supported investigators for 
collaborative projects. Reference data from several public sources are 
integrated within the system and can be a source of comparison with 
experimental data. The reference data are available to the public, while 
experimental data are initially visible only to investigators. Ultimately, 
aggregated experimental data and anonymous research records can 
be made available to non-DAIT investigators through the mechanisms 
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Finally, as technology makes whole-genome analyses 
faster and cheaper, the need for sharing samples will be 
replaced by the sharing of data. One investigator’s “affected” 
could be another investigator’s “control.” However, IRBs 
historically have been concerned with informed consent 
for the collection and sharing of specimens (blood, DNA, 
etc.). Both IRBs and investigators should anticipate sharing 
of data derived from specimens and be able to document 
participants’ consent for this purpose.
2. Ensure that there are appropriate data security 
mechanisms and review bodies to protect privacy interests in 
aggregated databases. By design, the research facilitated by 
combination and re-analysis of datasets within de-identified 
databases should be exempt from complete prospective IRB 
review. By only accepting data that cannot be directly linked 
to living persons, studies in these databases do not constitute 
human participants research under US regulations (http://
www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/cdebiol.pdf).
This may lead to a false sense of security, given that complex 
phenotypes and extensive genotypes may be used to re-
identify individuals. Re-identification should be prevented 
using technology that does not significantly degrade the 
utility of the data (see Recommendation 7) and policies 
that address the appropriate uses of those data. Only data 
in de-identified, aggregated form should be accessible to all 
users. Access to record-level data must be limited, either by 
keeping all data within the confines of the secure database 
and providing users with sophisticated analytical capacity, 
or by requiring legal agreements to prevent attempted 
re-identification of participants. Downloading and re-
distribution of data should be carefully controlled. If allowed 
at all, extraction of record-level data should only be permitted 
for specified, pre-approved purposes. Database stewards 
should play an active role in the periodic review of data use to 
confirm that data integrity is not compromised and that any 
proposed data use is consistent with the initial approval by 
the IRB and consent of the participants. Ideally, this oversight 
should come from the organization (e.g., NIH Institute) 
holding the aggregated data, and not from the multiple IRBs 
that approved the original data collection.
3. Informed consent should take into account the potential 
incorporation of data into aggregated databases. Research
into the attitudes of participants suggests that the majority of 
them are willing to allow their de-identified data to be used 
for future research by either the investigator who recruited 
them or by other investigators in the future [5]. However, 
it seems likely that very few consent processes have fully 
anticipated the possibility that data would be included in 
databases controlled by private corporations, the federal 
government, or international consortia. Surveys have found 
that a substantial fraction of participants may not want their 
data used in this manner. In one report, the overwhelming 
majority (more than 80%) of survey respondents felt that 
new consent was required for each use of DNA samples for 
research [6]. Some may wish to limit the use of their data 
(e.g., to studies of their own disease or condition). Some 
may limit the use of their data to exclude the study of mental 
illness or studies that have the potential to stigmatize their 
families or ethnic groups. Others may wish their data to be 
used for nonprofit research only, or have concerns about 
the custody of their data and their ability to withdraw from 
research. Legal action brought by the Havasupai tribal 
members and families with Canavan disease, along with the 
recent Washington University v. Catalona decision, all point to 
the importance of these considerations [7,8].
Ethically and logically, one cannot give informed consent 
to unspecified actions that may or may not occur at some 
time in the future. As pointed out by Arnason in a discussion 
of Icelanders’ participation in the deCODE Genetics 
databases, participants were given a choice of consent forms 
to sign—one that allowed only the current research, and 
one that allowed future research on stored samples [9]. 
Nonetheless, it is not practicable to incorporate all future 
research possibilities into a research protocol or consent 
process. Arnason suggests that informed consent may not 
be possible in this context. At best, participants can grant 
permission to unspecified research by indicating their 
understanding of the scope of future uses, the degree of 
de-identification/anonymity entailed, whether they will be 
re-contacted or informed of future findings, the ability (or 
not) and procedure required to withdraw from the database, 
the potential users of their data, and measures taken to 
regulate the database and ensure their privacy is protected. 
As Caulfield points out [10], this variation on the traditional 
consent model actually gives participants more autonomy 
over the use of specimens or data derived there from.
4. Address special challenges of using data obtained 
from existing databases. Many current studies are being 
conducted with information and specimens collected for 
another purpose at substantial expense and labor [11]. 
Therefore, it seems inefficient and contrary to the public 
good to let these resources remain unused and attempt to 
re-establish similar registries or biobanks at public expense. 
However, it may never be possible to determine the specific 
wishes of the participants with regard to the re-use of their 
personal information and specimens. Given such situations, 
stewards of aggregated databases may consider different 
options. One involves oversight that includes assurance by 
contributing investigators that consent was obtained and 
that, beyond the verbatim license granted for the primary 
research, broader future uses by different investigators 
are permitted. Given the size and scope of the individual 
database, this oversight may come from the IRB or an 
institutional committee within a single university, or may 
involve governmental representatives, and an outside group. 
Second, it may be possible to address the problem of a lack of 
anticipated secondary use of data or specimens by consulting 
with legitimate representatives of the donor group(s) and 
obtaining approval for the new studies [12]. Typically, this 
would not be a single IRB, but could include patient support 
groups, veteran’s associations, leaders of indigenous people, 
etc. A third, though costly [13], option would be to re-contact 
individual participants and ask permission for the new study. 
There is no clear consensus on which of these (or other) 
methods to invoke in a particular instance. Nevertheless, 
prudence suggests establishing a data-use committee to make 
such decisions. However, if new research is contemplated that 
carries a risk of individual or group stigmatization, then re-
consent may be the appropriate choice regardless of who is 
responsible for making such decisions.
5. Pursue efforts directed at standardization of data.
Realizing the goals of database aggregation requires 
interoperability among the primary databases. Accordingly, 
standard data protocols should be developed and used. PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1336 September 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 9  |  e190
For example, participant demographic characteristics and 
medical conditions should be described using controlled 
vocabularies allowing careful matching of participants across 
studies. For example, the PhenX project (http://www.phenx.
org/) supported by the National Human Genome Research 
Institute is developing sets of standardized measures and 
surveys to be used with genome-wide association studies. 
The Public Population Project in Genomics (http://www.
p3gconsortium.org/) is a multinational collaboration to 
catalog and share methods, surveys, and other tools needed 
to do large-scale genetic research [14]. Currently, over 
100 studies with planned enrollment of over 11 million 
participants are part of the effort. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development has recently 
posted draft guidelines for the operation of genetic databanks 
that include best practices for data interchange (http://www.
oecd.org/document/50/0,3343,en_2649_34537_37646258_
1_1_1_1,00.html). The Clinical Data Standards Interchange 
Consortium has designed standards for the interoperability 
of clinical trial data submitted to the US Food and Drug 
Administration as well as globally (http://www.cdisc.org/
standards/index.html). Finally, the Open Biomedical 
Ontologies Foundry project (http://www.obofoundry.
org/) is a multinational collaboration that is attempting to 
coordinate the development of ontologies of biomedical 
interest, including a sequence ontology for describing genetic 
loci and sequence variations, a phenotype ontology for 
describing participant characteristics, and an investigation 
ontology for describing laboratory methodologies, etc., that 
will provide the standardized vocabulary necessary for true 
data interoperability [15].
6. Establish data sharing rules, including attribution of 
contributions. Investigators spend considerable time, effort, 
and money collecting data and specimens. Consequently, 
there is rightfully a sense of entitlement felt by investigators 
who may not believe it is appropriate to permit other 
scientists to analyze “their” data before they have completely 
finished with them. Large sums of public and private money 
have been spent to build and maintain investigative teams 
that are conducting original research primarily for the public 
benefit. These investigators may see little reward and much 
risk in participating in aggregated databases, despite the 
potential public good from sharing their data. There also 
may be concerns regarding the intellectual property created 
by the original investigator. Further, funding agencies or the 
investigator’s employers may limit the sharing of research 
data. The question of data ownership will be important 
not only for publication, but also with regard to grant 
applications, promotion, etc. There are currently no firm 
guidelines that protect investigators with regard to ownership 
and sharing of data. Therefore, stewards of aggregated 
databases should develop rules that establish the length of 
time or other conditions determining when an investigator 
can have absolute control over the data s/he has contributed, 
even after submission in the aggregated database. 
Publications and grant applications must clearly describe 
the origin of data taken from public or quasi-public sources 
(investigator/repository), and the original contributors must 
be given appropriate credit.
7. Adopt “best practices” to avoid identifiability of the 
data. Clinical research data can be collected and stored with 
several levels of confidentiality. The terminology in this area 
is confusing, but in general, data can be fully identified, 
de-identified (coded) but linkable to identifiers, or de-
identified and un-linkable to a code (i.e., “anonymized”) 
[16]. Participants may desire that their de-identified 
information be treated as if it were anonymous, and many 
conflate anonymity and de-identification, but it is relatively 
rare for research to be conducted under conditions of true 
anonymity—blood samples without names or numbers 
on the tubes, or clinical phenotypes that never contained 
explicit identifiers, for example. But the general concept of 
anonymity/identification is not absolute [17].
Genome-wide analyses by their very nature produce 
uniquely identifying information. It is estimated that between 
75–100 single nucleotide polymorphisms or fewer than 20 
microsatellite markers can unambiguously identify a single 
individual [18]. Likewise, a highly detailed clinical phenotype 
with participant demographic characteristics can be used to 
re-identify an individual. The most disconcerting scenarios 
regarding re-identification assume that there is some other 
database of identified participants to compare with. While 
it may seem unlikely that an individual’s genotype and 
phenotype would exist in more than one place, techniques 
such as “trail re-identification” have shown that this is often 
the case. That is, patients or research participants deposit 
seemingly de-identified data in multiple hospitals or other 
institutions that share information, revealing a visit pattern 
or “trail” that can be linked to individual identities [19]. The 
threat of sample re-identification will grow as more data are 
collected and aggregated. The concern extends for database 
users outside the academic research arena, including 
pharmaceutical companies, insurance companies, and law 
enforcement agencies with access to rich storehouses of 
public and private information to re-identify the phenotypes 
stored by researchers.
Technical approaches exist that can mask the identities of 
participants in large databases beyond the ad hoc approaches 
of removing links between data and identifiers as prescribed in 
the HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act) safe harbor provision. First, data can be generalized. 
For example, in storing genetic sequence information, AGG 
could become AG(G or C) at polymorphic residues [20,21]. 
Second, data can be encrypted at the source, and stored in 
encrypted form in the database server. A researcher would 
only be able to query a processing engine that would interact 
with the database and report the results. Analysis of record-
level information would still be possible, but that analysis 
would be done by the database host, and not by downloading 
the data to client computers. Third, data can be manipulated 
so that each record that is shared with other users is linked or 
mapped to a prespecified number of potential identities in the 
database. Thus the original data retain utility, but now have 
a much lower chance of being linked to a specific individual. 
While the computational methodologies necessary to protect 
data in this manner exist, their refinement and practical 
application require further development.
Concluding Comments
While there is considerable activity focused on providing 
public access to clinical trial data and on merging multiple 
databases, a set of best practices for this type of research is 
clearly needed. It is hoped that the recommendations offered 
here will facilitate scientifically and ethically sound research. PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1337 September 2008  |  Volume 5  |  Issue 9  |  e190
Since it is unlikely that the issues and proposed solutions 
described here will be static over time, they will need to be 
reviewed periodically. The consistency of data sharing and 
data protection must be evaluated and maintained. Data 
protection standards will evolve, and a methodology that 
was appropriate at one time may not be appropriate later. 
Equally likely to change are standards imposed by the user 
community and donor-participant community, and privacy 
protection methods will need to reflect those changes in 
order to retain the trust of all stakeholders. This is necessary 
to help realize the potential for personalized medicine.  
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